The green economy as sustainable alternative? by Knight, Daniel M.
1 
 
The Green Economy as Sustainable Alternative? 
Daniel M. Knight (University of St Andrews) 
Abstract 
This article explores the green economy as a sustainable alternative to austerity in Greece. I 
argue that the movement toward the green economy has been hijacked by multinational 
corporations taking advantage of austerity-era policy that encourages a repetition of the 
same neoliberal model of privatization, short-term accumulation, rentier agreements and 
resource extraction. This is contrary to views that cast 'crisis' as an incubator of economic 
strategies that may feed green ecological transformations of the economy leading, 
ultimately, to sustainable growth. Current configurations of advanced capitalist power 
enable and promote injurious ‘green grabbing’ in part by leveraging the fantasy of a green 
economy as a solution to the fiscal crisis. As an alternative to austerity the green economy 
requires further uncoupling from neoliberal business opportunism to allow natural capital to 
be harnessed as an economic asset for sustainable long-term public good. 
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Introduction 
Sitting in the second row of the Sheikh Zayed Theatre at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science in March 2013 I was almost trembling with anticipation as Alexis 
Tsipras, then leader of the Greek opposition, took to the stage. A young scholar of Greece, I 
had just taken-up post at the LSE and this was the first political celebrity I had ever 
encountered; a man and a party sending shockwaves across Europe with a no-nonsense 
anti-austerity message who flatly refused to bow to international financial tutelage. 
Although the audience did not know it, this was the man who would sweep to a resounding 
electoral victory less than two years later when his SYRIZA party recorded just over 36 
percent of the public vote, leaving the traditional parties of both Left and Right in ruins. 
Entitled “Greece’s Way Out of the Crisis”, Tsipras’ talk proposed that ‘The policies of 
austerity that are being implemented in Europe, not only in the eurozone, but also here in 
the UK, do not appear to be providing a viable exit from the crisis’. He argued that reforming 
the European Central Bank, Eurobonds and fiscal transfers - potential solutions to economic 
crisis - is unlikely to happen without social mobilization. ‘In the past, elites have never given 
up their power and privileges willingly. It is unlikely they will do so in the future. Only a 
democratic drive to change the balance of class forces within Europe can bring about a 
progressive exit’, his abstract read. 
After a speech delivered in English, the first question from the floor concerned how SYRIZA 
would invest in long-term sustainable energy and environmental development to create 
jobs in the green economy. Through a translator, Tsipras replied with a distinctly wry smile, 
“the truth is that from our side in Greece there is no discussion at all about effects on the 
environment because the situation is more important with what is happening with the 
people”.i He acknowledged the fear that seeking economic growth will have effects on the 
environment and that if he became Prime Minister he would implement a programme of 
sustainable development that would address the destruction of people’s rights and 
environmental degradation. He mentioned that the cost of petrol for central heating had 
skyrocketed, meaning people now felt like they were “living in the 1950s”, resorting to 
“burning anything they can find at hand which is causing huge problems for the 
environment in cities” (see Knight 2017). 
Despite the future Prime Minister’s contradictory response – at once denying that the 
environment was a core government or grassroots concern while citing increasing problems 
with heating provision – my own fieldwork found that in 2013 Greece the green economy 
was at the forefront of public debates on energy poverty, neo-colonial projects of resource 
extraction and dramatic environmental degradation. I had recently embarked on research 
funded by the National Bank of Greece (and later the Addison Wheeler Trust and 
Leverhulme Trust) on the social and ecological impact of renewable energy developments in 
central Greece as local people strived to pay suffocating new taxes, came to terms with 
unprecedented unemployment and discussed feelings of returning to an era of pre-
modernity (Knight 2015a). Originally initiatives aimed at repaying national debt and 
decreasing fiscal deficit through energy export to northern Europe, from 2011 there has 
been a remarkable surge in photovoltaic (solar) parks placed on agricultural land in central 
Greece and wind farms constructed in the Aegean Islands. Renewable energy developments 
provide a stable monthly income for disenfranchised farmers through feed-in tariffs and 
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have presented new employment opportunities for local mechanics and salespeople who 
have diversified into the green economy sector. 
A few months after Tsipras’ visit to London, I was contacted by a US think-tank requesting 
comment on a draft SYRIZA policy document placing sustainable development at the core of 
its plans for economic growth and emphasizing the roots of the SYRIZA movement in 
thematic social movements such as radical ecology. It is striking that since the onset of the 
global financial crisis, governments have scaled back their commitments to the green 
economy, overlooking the potential for economic growth through emerging ecologies of the 
socio-technical. Citing concerns of public funds, competitiveness and more pressing financial 
obligations, “green growth” has largely been abandoned in Western Europe. Yet, as Sean 
Sweeney (2015:1) of the Worker Institute at Cornell University has observed, austerity could 
potentially spur a fundamental departure from the slow and stuttering progress of 
environmental sustainability, offering opportunities for what SYRIZA has termed the 
‘ecological transformation of the economy’ that can offer ‘a contrast to capitalist 
competition, continuous enlargement and accumulation’ reinstating ‘the balance between 
human activities and natural resources … which ensures sustainable growth’.ii The ecological 
transformation of the economy can become a key element in a more just socio-political 
vision, as emergent ecologies of capital, technical solutions, and social arrangements find 
new and opportunistic possibilities in the wreckage of ongoing disasters, assisting 
imaginations beyond the apparent apocalypse of current crises (see Kirksey 2015). However, 
I argue that the movement toward the green economy as an alternative to austerity in 
Greece has been hijacked by multinational corporations taking advantage of austerity-era 
policy that encourages a repetition of the same neoliberal model of privatization, short-term 
accumulation, rentier agreements and resource extraction symptomatic of the relationship 
between the West and the new Global South (on the financialization of vital services see 
Muehlebach, this issue). It must be stated that the European Union-led drive for growth in 
the renewables sector has been supported by both the previous New Democracy and 
current SYRIZA-led coalition governments, as well as passively endorsed by many of my 
research participants who have knowingly invested in opportunistic programmes focused on 
short-term financial gains. 
 
From the Green Economy to Green Grabbing 
In many parts of the world, Fairhead, Leach and Scoones (2012:254) argue in their 
influential edited collection, “a new political economy of land and livelihoods is emerging, 
driven by ‘green’ market economics, and global discourses of the use and repair of 
ecosystems”. In theory, the green economy aims to reduce environmental risks by 
promoting sustainable development within the parameters of the neoliberal market system 
by introducing accountability into the appropriation of nature. The notion that natural 
resources and ecological services possess inherent economic value may not, on the surface, 
seem to differ from previous regimes of resource extraction such as oil prospecting or strip-
mining. However, as defined by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP, 2011) “to 
be green, an economy must not only be efficient, but also fair. Fairness implies recognizing 
global and country level equity dimensions, particularly in assuring a just transition to an 
economy that is low-carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive”.iii Ideally, the green 
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economy takes the relationship between the human and non-human world that is integral 
to the neoliberal project and reimagines corporate accountability to both society and 
nature. Maintaining a market-driven focus at the heart of environmental management and 
ecosystems services, the green economy champions “ecological modernization where 
economic growth and environmental conservation work in tandem” within a just social and 
ethical calculus (Fairhead et. al. 2012:240, see also Mol and Spaargarden 2000). 
 
The notion that “nature must pay its way” has resulted in all things green being big business 
in mainstream models of economic growth for decades and the largely hegemonic 
neoliberal, growth-focused and technocentric definitions of the green economy often 
suggests the re-emergence of familiar colonial power-relations (Howe 2014, Argenti and 
Knight 2015). The appropriation of land and resources for food or fuel under the banner of 
sustainability and environmentalism has been termed “green grabbing”, where "green" 
credentials are a façade for exploitative extractive practices. For instance, as Nicolas Argenti 
and I (2015:782) have argued for renewable energy developments in Greece, “the fact that 
wind and solar power are renewable, inexhaustible resources might seem to make it 
impossible for them to be plundered in the way that finite resources such as timber or oil 
might be, but this is not how things are perceived in Greece today, where renewable energy 
projects are coming to be seen as new forms of extractive economy, harnessing local natural 
resources for the benefit of foreign corporations”. In other words, a whole multitude of sins 
can be kept from the public imagination when strategically packaged as ‘green’. In green 
grabbing, environmental agendas are the core drivers and goals of grabs – whether linked to 
biodiversity conservation, biocarbon sequestration, biofuels, ecosystem services, 
ecotourism or "offsets" related to any and all of these (Leach 2012). Green grabbing is a 
rapidly growing part of the green economy's dark side, Melissa Leach (2012) notes, where 
“ecosystems stand to be ‘asset-stripped’ for profit and dispossession and further poverty 
amongst already-poor land and resource users is all too likely”. If sustainable development 
continues to be promoted through existing market-based systems then it is imperative to 
give more emphasis to an agenda of asset distribution and social justice achieved through 
drastically improved processes of local consultation, transparency and informed consent. 
 
Promoting Renewables in Greece 
Since 2011 there has been a surge in renewable energy developments in rural and island 
Greece but many initiatives have already proved to be unsustainable. It is the case that new 
employment opportunities and avenues for technological innovation have been created but 
too often government rhetoric on green growth has not been supported by grassroots 
infrastructure or consultation (on austerity and infrastructure see Bear, this issue). For 
instance, the three-tier programme to make Greece a leader in solar energy generation by 
encouraging photovoltaic panels to be placed on private homes for self-sufficiency as well as 
agricultural land and large-scale solar parks generating energy for international export has 
fallen into the usual traps of market capitalism. Since the launch of the renewables drives, 
energy projects faced one major problem, namely liquidity, and it was hoped that the 
private sector would come to the rescue. Such projects have indeed attracted the attention 
of European companies and governments who have voiced interest in importing renewable 
energy from Greece as a means of meeting their own renewable energy generation targets. 
Here I wish to look at the solar energy case in more detail. 
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Within the context of the severe social consequences of seven years of fiscal austerity 
resulting from a €320 billion international bailout plan, I have worked with agriculturalists 
installing photovoltaic panels on their land on the plain of western Thessaly in central 
Greece. Many feel that they are being asked to make a choice between a stable monthly 
income offered by seemingly generous feed-in tariffs and lease agreements or potential 
economic destitution. For farmers, the average monthly income from signing twenty-five 
year contracts to, as they say, “grow photovoltaics” and sell solar energy to the provider is 
currently greater than the revenue from crop production, yet the average loan required for 
a typical 100 kW/h photovoltaic development on agricultural land is €180,000. Loans are 
advertised as returnable over twenty-five years with repayments automatically deducted 
from the monthly income provided by the panels. In central Greece, farmers refer to new 
photovoltaic parks as a foreign invasion, ravishing the most fertile farmland in Greece for 
the benefit of multinational investors and bureaucrats in northern Europe.iv In June 2013 
the Greek New Democracy government announced a 44.7 percent cut in the feed-in tariff 
and stopped issuing building permits for photovoltaic developments later that year. The 
subsidies for feed-in tariffs had dried up. The solar drive has since been ‘frozen’, often 
leaving hundreds of thousands of euros-worth of technology and equipment lying dormant 
on the plains, still unconnected to the grid.v 
 
From the prospective of small-scale entrepreneurs, the programme offered substantial 
business opportunities. With around 25 percent unemployment across all sectors, 
employment diversification is both commonplace and necessary. Trained mechanics, 
electricians and technicians took jobs associated with photovoltaic installation. Photovoltaic 
systems are perceived as relatively simple to install and require minimal extra training for 
people with a background in electronics and engineering. Courses offering certificates in 
correct installation practice are available from local colleges, but these are not necessary 
and rarely completed. Professionals from unrelated fields became involved in photovoltaic 
installation including car mechanics, electricians, structural engineers, kitchen salesmen and 
civil servants. In an era of severe austerity, employment diversification opportunities were 
most welcome. 
 
The new line in ‘second jobs’ extended to private businesses importing and installing 
photovoltaic panels and agencies dealing exclusively in preparing the significant paperwork 
and negotiating the complex bureaucratic channels involved with securing contracts (Knight 
and Bell 2013, Knight 2015b). Another line employed surveyors and architects who assessed 
the plausibility for photovoltaic developments on particular land or buildings. In 2012 in the 
town of Trikala alone there were fifteen private companies dedicated to importing and 
installing photovoltaic panels. Some small businesses were subsidiaries of larger companies 
on the Greek stock market, whilst others floated themselves. In one example of 
diversification into the green economy, a kitchen salesman named Giorgos established a 
prosperous photovoltaic company in Kalampaka. He dedicated a floor of his showroom and 
a substantial garage to his new business. With a team of technicians, he imported and 
installed solar panels in homes and fields throughout western Thessaly. He set up the 
business in 2008 after identifying a rising demand for renewable energy technology in the 
region. In 2012, Giorgos emphasised that the demand for photovoltaics had never been 
greater owing to a combination of factors, including a decrease in the cost of installation, 
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the gradually decreasing feed-in tariffs making people invest whilst the programme was still 
profitable, a rise in awareness of the programme and a substantial feeling that this was the 
only way to gain a stable income during times of austerity. Even at a time of growth in the 
sector, private business owners acknowledged that their enterprise was in all probability 
temporary; Giorgos said that “in five years, maximum, I will not have this business. The 
green energy bubble will burst”. He cited a lack of government support, limited consultation 
‘on the ground’ with local farmers, the absence of special training for bureaucrats at the 
regional level dealing with energy programmes, and what he termed “the definite 
corruption of people in power siphoning-off money into their own pockets”. Giorgos knew 
that his enterprise was opportunistic and his prophecies held much truth; in 2014 he went 
out of business. 
 
Stories of hope followed by pain extend to the local offices of Greece’s main energy 
supplier, DEI. When I visited in 2012 there was an air of optimism about the future of the 
green economy and the new job opportunities that might be created in one of the few 
expanding markets. The director, a moustached gentleman in his mid-fifties named 
Apostolis, voiced his concerns about German companies “circling like sharks” ready to 
divide-up and sell-off DEI piece-by-piece and claimed that the fate of the company lay in the 
success or otherwise of the renewables initiative. During my following periodic visits the 
tone of conversation has rapidly grown more sombre. In autumn 2016 job and wage cuts 
were being implemented, something the director put down to the freezing of the 
renewables programme which he claimed was due to corruption in government and a lack 
of knowledge transfer at the grassroots level. Apostolis passionately expressed his belief 
that the initiative was “nonsense” and “empty”, a façade to win votes and a short-term 
policy that had failed to reach its immense potential because it had been used as a political 
tool both by the EU and in Greece. Apostolis had recently been forced to release three 
members of staff and reduce most full-time employees to part-time contracts. He was only 
allowed to use his company car on two days a week to save on fuel bills. The agriculturalists 
too, he said, had been “cheated” by exaggerated promises of future sustainability when the 
programme “was never suitable, not even really meant to help them”. 
 
The green economy that was supposed to save Greece has, among my research participants, 
been primarily viewed as an extractive programme of neoliberal exploitation and eco-
degradation. The solar project has evoked discourses of international conspiracy and 
interference, of foreign tutelage and intervention, and of national backwardness, disgrace, 
and humiliation (Knight and Argenti 2015). Harnessing renewable energy raises paradoxes 
about resource ownership, national sovereignty, and the shifting geopolitical boundaries of 
international “energopower” (Boyer 2014). For the government officials I interviewed at the 
Regulatory Authority for Energy and at the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate 
Change, and for the local politicians and councillors deciding on the solar projects there is 
little option but to follow the path of renewable energy investment that actually helps to 
maintain the fundamental structures of neoliberalism that led to the current economic crisis 
– short-term projects of accumulation, exploitation of local and national resources to serve 
big business and corporate opportunism driven by market economics. Green though their 
cladding might be, the interventionist policies and privatization drives emerging in crisis-
ridden Greece appear to be projects of green grabbing akin to those prominent in the Global 
South. Many of my research participants believe that the Greek government is proposing 
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that the state become a ‘rent collector’, surviving on the extractive resource rents, taxes, 
and royalties paid by transnational companies while being exploited as part of the new 
Global South. 
 
Conclusion 
The green economy has great potential as an alternative to austerity politics in Greece and 
elsewhere in Europe. Yet, the priorities of European Union policymakers, in particular, 
continue to focus on what they believe to be complementary poles of market liberalisation 
and climate protection; EU, World Bank and IMF policy discourse asserts that liberalisation 
and market competition are the pre-requisites for an energy transition to a low-carbon 
future (Sweeney 2015:4). This neoliberal approach to the green economy seems to be failing 
across Europe, reinforcing social inequalities and serving the interests of multinationals 
instead of truly investing in a sustainable transition to new forms of energy production and 
environmental protection. One major concern of my research participants has been the lack 
of grassroots engagement; rarely have there been local consultation or public relations 
events about the programme of alternative energy, leading to a scattered distribution of 
photovoltaic parks in western Thessaly and an abundance of myths about the initiative, 
including the rumour that environmentally harmful new composite panels are being trialled 
in the area. Neither has there been an attempt to inform administrators in local government 
about the details of the project – in one major town the councillor responsible for EU 
programmes for agriculturalists claims that he gets his information from the farmers 
themselves and has not “spoken to Athens” for many years. There has been a general 
breakdown in systems of bureaucratic communication and information distribution, but this 
is hardly surprising in a country already on its knees. 
Contrary to views that cast 'crisis' as an incubator of economic strategies that may feed 
green ecological transformations of the economy leading, ultimately, to sustainable growth, 
multinational corporations in the green economy sector have taken advantage of austerity 
policy to pursue neoliberal business practices that benefit investors and bureaucrats in 
northern Europe while depleting local livelihoods. Current configurations of advanced 
capitalist power enable and promote injurious “green grabbing” in part by leveraging the 
fantasy of a green growth economy as a solution to the fiscal crisis. 
Although staggeringly off-mark in suggesting that environment, society and economy are 
not linked or discussed almost interchangeably in Greece today, Alexis Tsipras was correct in 
saying that elites and existing structures of economic power do not give up their privileges 
willingly. Projects that encourage investment in green futures need to be re-designed to put 
human, societal, ethical and environmental needs before private profit. This may take the 
form of energy democracy or smaller-scale community-led energy initiatives that are de-
centralised from government control. The small-scale photovoltaic developments placed on 
private homes in Greece have, for instance, been very successful in bringing down heating 
prices for the homeowner and providing a degree of self-sufficiency in energy production. 
Homeowners report feeling a degree of sovereignty, empowerment and self-determination 
and say that their optimism has spilt over into other realms of their everyday life. As an 
alternative to austerity the green economy requires further uncoupling from neoliberal 
business opportunism. Targeted public expenditure, policy reforms and regulation changes 
should guide private investment that aims to reduce carbon emission, enhance energy 
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efficiency and prevent eco-degradation. Then natural capital can be harnessed as an 
economic asset for sustainable long-term public good. 
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